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barred, pointing to a line of South Carolina Supreme Court
cases that have permitted the issue of competence to be
introduced during collateral, or PCR, proceedings.
7'
In response, the court rejected Plath's rebuttal attempt,
including the supporting cases, distinguishing between a
state court allowing the unraised issue to be included in a
PCR application, and a federal court deliberating it on
habeas review.72 Even in light of the cases cited by Plath, the
7'I. at 602.
72Id. at 602.
court refused to go beyond the limitations of habeas review
established by the principles of comity.This is yet another
example of the stringency of the Strickland standard, and
consequently evidence of the dire necessity of raising all
potential issues at trial in order to preserve them for appeal.
Summary and analysis by:
Mary K. Martin
SATCIER v. PRUETT
126 F.3d 561 (4th Cir. 1997)'
United States Court Of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Around 7:00 p.m. on the evening of March 31, 1991,
Deborah Abel was riding her bicycle along a path which
runs parallel to Lee Highway in Arlington County, Virginia.
2
As she entered a relatively secluded area on the path, she
noticed an "unthreatening man" walking toward her as she
rode.3 As she passed this man, they made eye contact.4 Two
or three seconds later, the man grabbed Abel from behind,
knocked her eye-glasses off, pulled her off of her bicycle,
dragged her into a ditch along the path, and began beating
her about the face and head.5 In the ensuing struggle, the
man managed to pull her pants part way down.6 While Abel
was being assaulted, Mark Polemani was riding his bicycle
along the same stretch of path. Polemani observed a man,
who appeared to be punching the ground, kneeling just off
the path near a prone bicycle. 7 Polemani got off of his bicy-
cle and approached the man.As he did so, however, the man
grabbed Abel's purse and ran away. Polemani briefly chased
the man but eventually returned to assist Abel.
Abel and Polemani each gave the police a description
of Abel's attacker. Abel described him as "a stocky black
male between twenty-five and thirty years old, about 5'9" or
5'10" and 190 to 200 pounds" with a "short 'Afro' haircut"
and no facial scars.8 A police artist made a sketch based on
Abel's description. Polemani gave a similar description and
an "almost identical" sketch was drawn.9 Upon seeing both
'The United States Supreme Court denied Satcher's petition
for a writ of certiorari on December 2,1997.Satcber v.Pruett, 118
S.Ct. 595 (1997). Michael Satcher was executed by lethal injection
on December 9,1997.
2Satcher v.Pruett, 126 E3d 561,563 (4th Cir. 1997).




7Satche, 126 E3d at 564.
81d.
9 d.
sketches, Polemani commented that the sketch based on
Abel's description was "better."'0
On the same evening that Abel was attacked, Ann
Borghesani was attacked as she was walking along the same
stretch of path." Borghesani's partially nude body was dis-
covered shortly after 8:00 a.m. the next morning at the bot-
tom of a stairwell in anAir Force Association building locat-
ed alongside the bike path less than 100 yards from where
Abel was attacked. 2 Borghesani had been raped and
stabbed twenty-one times with a "sharp-tipped object." 3
Additionally, her purse and some of her jewelry were miss-
ing.' 4 A few days later, Borghesani's purse and Abel's purse
were found together in some bushes located about two
blocks from the Air Force Association building.
Michael Satcher was arrested five months later, on
August 18, 1990, for trying to attack three different women
along a different bike path in Arlington County that morn-
ing. 6 At the time of his arrest, Satcher, who is African-
American, was twenty-one years old, 5'6" tall, weighed 152
pounds, had short hair, and a facial scar.7 Satcher voluntari-
ly gave the police blood, hair, and saliva samples. 8 The blood
test revealed that Satcher's blood type, which occurs in
seven percent of the population, was the same type as the
'0Id. The descriptions given by Abel and Polemani differed
.somewhat" from Satcher's actual appearance. Id. at 564-65. See
infra note 17 and accompanying text.





"Satcher, 126 E3d at 564.
61 d
'71d. at 564. Satcher's actual appearance differed fromAbel and
Polemani's descriptions in four out of the six characteristics they
described. Satcher's age, height, weight and facial scar were all
inconsistent with their descriptions. The only portions of the
descriptions which fit Satcher were"black male" and"short.. .hair."
See, supra, note 10 and accompanying text.
18Id.
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semen sample taken from Borghesani's body. 9 Tests on the
hair samples were inconclusive.2 The Commonwealth also
conducted a DNA analysis on Satcher's blood which
"showed that Satcher's DNA matched the DNA from swabs
taken from Borghesani's body and clothing"2
In late June 1991, more than 15 months after Abel's
attack and a mere 15 days before trial, the police brought
Abel and Polemani in to view a lineup.' Prior to viewing the
lineup, both Abel and Polemani refreshed their memories
using the sketch based onAbel's description.23 Polemani was
unable to pick anyone out of the lineup with certainty.4 Abel
narrowed it down to number two and number four, but ulti-
mately chose number two because he looked "unthreaten-
ing: 2" Satcher was number four in the lineup.
When Satcher's trial began, Abel was in the courtroom
for two days during jury selection and observed Satcher
being brought into the courtroom, sitting at defense table,
and leaving the courtroom.26After a few hours of observing
Satcher in court, Abel determined that Satcher was the
man who attacked her. At trial, the judge allowed Abel to
identify Satcher as her attacker.27 On redirect examination,
Abel explained that she determined Satcher was her attack-
er based on her in court, observations."
Satcher was convicted of the robbery, assault and battery,
and attempted rape ofAbel and of the robbery, rape, and cap-
ital murder of Borghesani. 29 The jury recommended the
death penalty based on both the "vileness" and "future dan-
gerousness" aggravators" and the Circuit Court of Arlington
19Satche, 126 F3d at 564. Based on this seven percent figure,
there were more than 3,000 men in the Washington, D.C. area
whose blood types would have matched the semen sample.
201d.
21d. Satcher did not have the opportunity to conduct inde-
pendent DNA testing until 1995.Id. at 570. It does not appear that
Satcher's trial counsel requested the appointment of an expert in
DNA analysis for use at trial.
22Id. at 565.
23Satcher, 126 E3d at 565.
2Id. At trial Polemani said he was "pretty sure" that Satcher
was Abel's attacker. Id.
21Id. Abel picked number two despite commenting that num-
ber four, Satcher,"looked 'almost identical' to the sketch." Id.
26Id.
27Satcher, 126 E3d at 565.Trial counsel objected to this testi-
mony but his objection was overruled.
1Id.
2Id.
"Satcher also raised an issue regarding the trial court's refusal
to dismiss an arguably biased juror from the venire for cause
which forced Satcher to remove the juror by using a peremptory
challenge. The juror at issue, Mr. Middle, admitted that his close
relationship with some Arlington County police officers "might"
affect his ability to be impartial. Id. at 573.This issue is discussed,
infra, at note 63 and accompanying text.
"'Satcher, 126 E3d at 565. See Va. Code § 19.2-264.2 (1995).
The mitigating evidence presented by Satcher consisted entirely
of the testimony of friends and family regarding his "history and
background." Id. at 572.
County sentenced Satcher to death.32 The Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed Satcher's conviction and sentence on direct
appeal 3 and the United States Supreme Court denied certio-
rari. Satcher filed a motion for rehearing on the petition for
certiorari which was also denied.3 Satcher filed a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Arlington
County in November 1993. This petition was dismissed by
the circuit court, but the clerk's office failed to notify
Satcher's state habeas counsel of the dismissal until after the
deadline to file his appeal in the Supreme Court of Virginia
had already passed. In an attempt to rectify its mistake, the
circuit court entered a new order dismissing the complaint.
The Supreme Court of Virginia, however, dismissed the
appeal as untimely after holding that the circuit court lacked
the power to take such remedial measures.'0 The United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari on state habeas. 7
Satcher then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Vruginia."The district court granted the writ on the ground that
the in-court identification of Satcher byAbel denied Satcher due
process under the FourteenthAmendment.9 The district court
also noted that, under Virginia law, compelling a defendant to
use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have
been removed for cause was prejudicial error."0 The
Commonwealth appealed the granting of the writ to the United
States Court ofAppeals for the Fourth Circuit arguing that, even
if the admission of the in-court identification testimony was
erroneous, it was harmless error. Satcher cross-appealed arguing
several issues including that (1) the district court erred in hold-
ing thatTeague barred his due process claim for the trial court's
refusal to excuse a potentially biased juror for cause; (2) the
existence of new DNA evidence showed his actual innocence
and thus allowed the court of appeals to consider his previous-
ly defaulted claims; and (3) his claims for ineffective assistance
of trial counsel were not defaulted due to the ineffective assis-
tance of state habeas counsel."'
-Id. at 565.
"Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 421 S.E.2d 821
(1992).
3Satcher v. Virginia, 507 U.S. 933 (1993).
"sSatcher v. Virginia, 507 U.S. 1046 (1993).
3'Satcher v. Pruett, 126 E3d 561,565 (4th Cir. 1997).
"'Satcher v.Netherland, 513 U.S. 1193 (1995).
"Satcher v. Netherkand, 944 ESupp. 1222 (E.D.Va. 1996).
"9Satche, 944 ESupp at 1303.
401d. at 1277.The district court ultimately concluded that the
"new rule" doctrine of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), barred
collateral review of this issue. It noted, however, that, notwith-
standingTeague, it would have concluded that the trial court's fail-
ure to exclude Mr. Middle was clear error.
4ISatcher also alleged that trying him jointly for both the
attack onAbel and the murder of Borghesani violated due process.
The court of appeals held that this claim was procedurally default-
ed because in state court, on either direct appeal or state habeas,
Satcher "failed to mention the federal constitution or cite any cases
examining the right to be tried separately under the due process
clause: Satcher, 126 E2d at 573. Defense counsel must be careful
to make objections and present claims which are couched in both
state and federal terms to avoid procedural default.
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HOLDING
The Fourth Circuit held (1) the admission of the in-
court identification testimony constituted only harmless
error;42 (2) the district court's Teague analysis regarding the
trial court's refusal to dismiss a juror for cause was correct; 43
(3) Satcher could not establish cause and prejudice under
Strickland and thus his claims for ineffective assistance of
trial claims were defaulted;44 and (4) the new DNA evidence
did not establish actual innocence, but merely showed, at
best, that the Commonwealth's evidence was inconclu-
sive.45 Thus, it reversed the district court and denied the
writ of habeas corpus. 6
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. In-Court Identification
Traditionally, a habeas court reviewing the admission in
the trial court of identification testimony must engage in a
two-step analysis. First, it must determine "whether the
identification procedure [was] unnecessarily suggestive"47
A procedure is "unnecessarily suggestive if a positive iden-
tification is likely to result from factors other than the wit-
ness's own recollection of the crime."48 Second, if the pro-
cedure was unnecessarily suggestive, a court must consider
whether the identification testimony was nevertheless reli-
able when viewed in light of the "totality of the circum-
stances"49 Factors which comprise the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" include:
(1) the witness's opportunity to view the per-
petrator at the time of the crime; (2) the wit-
ness's degree of attention at the time of the
offense; (3) the accuracy of the witness's
prior description of the perpetrator; (4) the
witness's level of certainty when identifying
the defendant as the perpetrator at the time
of confrontation; and (5) the length of time
between the crime and confrontation.5




"Satcher, 126 E3d at 563.
47d. at 566 (citing, Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 110
(1977) & Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188,198-99 (1972)).
-Id. (citing United States v. Peoples, 748 E2d 934,935-36 (4th
Cir. 1984) (noting that the in- court identification of "the only
young black male in the courtroom" might have been unnecessar-
ily suggestive)).
Id. (citing Manson, 432 U.S. at 100 & Biggers, 409 U.S. at
198).
"'United States v. Wilkerson, 84 E3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1996)
(citing Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199- 200).
The combined force of these factors must then be
"weighed against the 'corrupting effect of the suggestive
identification itself.'" 5 Combined with the examination of
the "totality of the circumstances," a reviewing court "may
also consider other evidence of the defendant's guilt when
assessing the reliability of the in-court identification 5 "
In the present case, the court of appeals refused to con-
sider either the "suggestiveness" of Abel's in-court identifi-
cation of Satcher or the Biggers factors for "totality of the
circumstances 53 In doing so, the court of appeals stated
"[w]e find it unnecessary to resolve the question of
whether Abel's in-court identification was unreliable under
all of the circumstances and thus inadmissible under the
due process clause: Instead, the court of appeals deter-
mined that "Abel's in-court identification testimony, if erro-
neous, was harmless error." 5 In refusing to even consider
the reliability of Abel's in-court identification, the court of
appeals seems to be approaching a"clearly guilty" standard
of review. The court of appeals virtually ignored what the
district court recognized as the "profound impact" that an
in-court victim identification of the defendant has on the
jury.,
Instead, the court of appeals focused on the other "solid
and persuasive identification evidence" used at trial by the
Commonwealth.5 This "solid persuasive" evidence, however,
consisted of a police sketch based on descriptions of the per-
petrator which were, at best, flawed and testimony regarding
the lineup fifteen days before trial in which neither Abel nor
Polemani positively identified Satcher. Based on this "solid
persuasive" evidence and the unreliability of Abel's in-court
identification, the district court concluded that the in-court
identification had a "profound impact" on the jury. Based on
5 Wilkerson, 84 E3d at 695 (quoting Manson, 432 U.S. at 114).
"2Id. See, e.g., United States v. Lau, 828 E2d 871,875 (1st Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988); United States v.
DiTommaso, 817 E2d 201, 214 n.17 (2d Cir. 1987); & United
States v.Bell, 812 E2d 188,193 (5th Cir. 1987).This aspect of"total-
ity of the circumstances" analysis is akin to a"harmless error" analy-
sis.The difference, however, is that the factors outlined in Manson
and Biggers should be considered before any weight is given to
the other evidence in the case.
'5Satcher 126 E3d at 567.
141d.
"Id. Under "harmless error" analysis, a trial court's error can
only be reversed if "the error 'had substantial and injurious effect
or influence in determining the jury's verdict:Id. (quoting Brecht
v. Abramson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). If, however, a reviewing
court has "grave doubt" about whether an error had a "substantial
and injurious effect or influence" and finds itself in "virtual
equipoise"on the issue,"the error [was] not harniless:Id. (quoting
Cooper v. Taylor, 103 E3d 366,370 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)). In
conducting harmless error review, the court reviewed the trial
record de novo.Id. (citing Correll v. Thompson, 63 E3d 1279,1291
(4th Cir. 1995)). Clearly, de novo review by the court of appeals
gives absolutely no deference to the district court on the crucial
issue of impact on the jury, an issue that the district court is in a
much better position to decide.
56Satchhe 126 E3d at 566.
17Id. at 568.
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this same evidence, however, the court of appeals concluded
that the in-court identification "neatly tied together the more
important identification evidence ... but it was not the cor-
nerstone of the identification testimony" and could have had
no "substantial and injurious effect" on the jury. 58
The court of appeals' analysis of the evidence in this
case virtually ignores the reasoning of the Supreme Court in
Kotteakos v. United States59 which is quoted extensively to
justify its decision. In Kotteakos, the Court reasoned that
"[t]he question is ... what effect [could] the error ... rea-
sonably [have been] taken to have had upon the jury's deci-
sion 'The Kotteakos Court went on to say that" [o]ne must
judge others' reactions not by his own, but with allowance
for how others might react and not be regarded generally
as acting without reason:'6' Thus the evidence had a "sub-
stantial and injurious effect" on the jury's verdict if it could
have reasonably affected the jury's determination. Based
on the type of evidence involved in this case, the district
court's determination that there was a reasonable probabil-
ity that the jury was affected was entirely appropriate.
Counsel in Virginia should be very wary of this decision
and the steps it takes toward a clearly guilty standard of
review. If the Commonwealth attempts to use questionable
in-court identification testimony, defense counsel should
vigorously cross-examine the witness regarding how he or
she arrived at the determination that the defendant is the
same person that allegedly committed the act at issue.
II. Failure to Remove a Juror for Cause and
Compelled use of Peremptory Challenges
During jury selection one of the venire members, Mr.
Middle, indicated that he knew several Arlington County
police officers and that this might affect his ability to weigh
the facts.62 Satcher requested that Middle be excused for
nILa at 569. In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals
engaged in a truncated"totality of the circumstances"analysis based only
on factors one and three flom Biggers: opportunity to view the perpe-
trator at the time of the crime and accuracy of the prior description of
the perpetrator. Id Its determination that the sketch was"accurate" was
based entirely onAbel's statement that it ranked about an eight on a scale
of one to ten. Idt The court of appeals did not mention the flawed
descriptions given to police byAbel and Polemani right after the attack.
11328 U.S. 750 (1946).
6"Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,764 (1946).
'Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764 (emphasis added).
"Satche, 126 E3d at 573After giving this response and requesting
to be excused from the panel,Middle was questioned by the trial judge.
The judge then attempted to rehabilitate Middle by asking leading ques-
tions regarding his ability to be fair. Middle predictably answered these
questions affirmatively. See Satcher v. Netherland, 944 ESupp. 1222,
1287 (E.D.Va. 1996). Under Virginia law, a prospective juror's "[mlere
assent to a trial judge's questions or statements, or to counsel's leading
inquiry is not enough to rehabilitate a prospective juror who has ini-
tially demonstrated a prejudice or partial predisposition!' Griffin v.
Commonwealth, 19 Va.App. 619,625,454 S.E.2d 363,366 (1995). See
also McGill v. Commonwealth, 1OVaApp.237,242,391 S.E.2d 597,600
(1990) & Foley v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.App. 149, 159-60, 379 S.E.2d
915,921, affd en banc, 9Va.App. 175,384 S.E.2d 813 (1989).
cause because he was not "without exception"6 as required
by Virginia law.6 The trial court refused this request and
Satcher struck Middle using a peremptory challenge." On
direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia determined
that Middle was not biased and declined to address the
peremptory challenge issue.
On federal habeas, the district court held that collateral
review of the issue was barred by Teague v. Lane.' Despite
this holding, the district court determined that Middle was
not impartial and the trial court's failure to exclude him was
"manifest error" under Virginia law.67 The court of appeals
held that the district court's Teague analysis was correct. It
found that, based on Ross v. Oklahoma,' there was no
"right (under the Due Process Clause) to exercise peremp-
tory challenges on a panel free from jurors who should
have been excused for cause" in existence when Satcher's
conviction became final in February 1993.69
It is exceedingly well established under Virginia law,
however, that it is "prejudicial error to force a defendant to
use the peremptory strikes afforded him by [Virginia Code
Section 19.2-262] to exclude a venireman who is not free
"'See Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-357 (1990). See also, Griffin v.
Commonwealth, 19 Va.App. 619,621,454 S.E.2d 363,364 (1995);
Justus v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 971, 975, 266 S.E.2d 87, 90
(1980); & Breeden v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 297,300,227 S.E.2d
734,737 (1976).
'UnderVirginia law,"giving unqualified credence to the testi-
mony of a law enforcement officer based solely on the officer's
official status constitutes impermissible bias!' Gosling v.
Commonwealth, 7 Va.App. 642, 645, 376 S.E.2d 541, 544 (1989)
(citing Mullis v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 564, 571, 351 S.E.2d
919,923 (1987)).
"Satcher v. Pruett, 126 E3d 561,573-74 (4th Cir. 1997).
"489 U.S. 288 (1989).
"Satcher v. Pruett, 944 ESupp. 1222, 1288 (E.D.Va. 1996).
"487 U.S. 81 (1988) (holding that the SixthAmendment right
to an impartial jury is not implicated if a biased juror is not
excused for cause but is excused with a peremptory challenge and
that a reviewing court should look only at the jury that actually sat
in determining a Sixth Amendment claim).The Ross Court, how-
ever, explicitly declined to "decide the broader question whether,
in the absence of Oklahoma's limitation on the 'right' to exercise
peremptory challenges,'a denial or impairment' of the exercise of
peremptory challenges occurs if the defendant uses one or more
challenges to remove jurors who should have been excused for
cause"Ross, 487 U.S. at 91 n.4.
6"Satcher v. Pruett, 126 E3d 561,574 (4th Cir. 1997). Defense
counsel may be able to argue, as Satcher did in the present case,
that in declining to "decide the broader question whether, in the
absence of Oklahoma's limitation on the 'right' to exercise
peremptory challenges,'a denial or impairment' of the exercise of
peremptory challenges occurs if the defendant uses one or more
challenges to remove jurors who should have been excused for
cause," the Ross Court impliedly left the determination of this
issue up to the States.Ross, 487 U.S. at 91 n.4.The court of appeals
did not address this argument on the merits in Satcher, so it is not
explicitly foreclosed. On collateral review, however, the rule
sought in this argument is likely to be barred by the Teague new
rule doctrine. Satcher, 126 E3d at 574. Despite this fact, this may
be a viable argument on direct appeal or even at the trial level.
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from exception: 70 This rule has been operative and
enforced in Virginia since before the Civil War.7' This rule,
however, is based exclusively on Virginia constitutional,
statutory, and common law 2
In light of the limited likelihood of success on the fed-
eral level as a result of Satcher, Ross, and Teague, defense
counsel must argue this issue in the Virginia courts with
added fervor. The rule is very well established in Virginia
and should be followed by the courts. In order to leave the
courts with little choice but to adhere to this rule, counsel
must be especially careful to build an adequate record on
voir dire. Defense counsel should ask searching questions
which get to the root of potential juror's beliefs and not
acquiesce to leading questions by the Commonwealth's
Attorney or the trial judge."
M. DNA Evidence
Satcher claimed on appeal that he had discovered"new"
DNA evidence which showed he was actually innocent of
these crimes. This evidence consisted of an independent
analysis of Satcher's DNA which was compared with the
DNA tests introduced at Satcher's trial in 1991.74 Satcher's
tests showed that the results of one of the four DNA"probes"
used at trial which matched Satcher's DNA to DNA samples
from Borghesani's body fell outside of the Commonwealth
testing lab's match criterion by as much as one percent.
Satcher argued that this new evidence of actual innocence
"'Breeden v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 297,300,227 S.E.2d 734,
737 (1976) (citing Dowdy v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 727,
737 (1852)). See also, George v.Angelone, 901 ESupp 1070, 1088
and 1088 n.1l (E.D.Va. 1995) (citing Breeden, 217 Va. at 300, and
recognizing that under Virginia law it is prejudicial error to force a
defendant to use a peremptory challenge to exclude a veniremen
who is not free from exception, but determining that under Ross v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988), no federal issue was presented and,
further, that the announcement of a federal rule comparable to the
Virginia rule would"clearly be breaking new constitutional ground"
and was thus barred by Teague v.Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)); Griffin
v. Commonwealth, 19 Va.App. 619,621,454 S.E.2d 363,364 (1995)
(citing Breeden, 217Va. at 300, and repeating the rule that it is prej-
udicial error to force a defendant to use a peremptory challenge to
exclude a veniremen who is not free from exception); Gosling v.
Commonwealth, 7VaApp. 642,647-648,376 S.E.2d 541,545 (1989)
(same)Justus v. Commonwealth, 220Va. 971,975,266 S.E.2d 87,90
(1980) (same); & Martin v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 436,445,271
S.E.2d 123, 129 (1980) (same).
"'Dowdy v. Commonwealth, 50Va. (9 Gratt.) 727,737 (1852).
2SeeVa. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-357 (1990);Va. Sup. Ct. Rule 3A:14;
& Breeden, 217 Va. at 300,227 S.E.2d at 737.Although the rule is
designed to effectuate the right to an impartial jury embodied in
the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as well as the cor-
responding right in the Virginia Constitution, U.S. CONST., amends.
VI and XIV & VA. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, the grounds for the rule have
always been based solely on Virginia law.
"See, Griffin, 19 Va.App. at 622,454 S.E.2d at 364-65 (stating
that" [tirial courts should not ... accept a venireperson's bare dec-
laration of impartiality without providing the means to assure that
the expression reflects the person's true state of mind").
7'4Satcher v. Pruett, 126 E3d 561,570 (4th Cir. 1997).
provided a"gateway" through which his previously defaulted
claims could pass in order to be considered on appeal.
7
The court reasoned that before this new evidence could
act as a"gateway" for his defaulted claims, Satcher must show
"it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would
have convicted him in light of the new evidence 7 6 The
court went on to say that Satcher's evidence merely showed
that the Commonwealth's DNA evidence was inconclusive
and that"it does not show that someone else was the source
of the DNA at the crime scene"' Thus, in order for new evi-
dence to provide a gateway for defaulted claims, the evi-
dence must establish actual innocence to the point that "no
reasonable juror" would have convicted the defendant.78
When DNA evidence will likely be at issue in any case,
defense counsel should request either funds to hire or the
appointment of an independent DNA expert to act as a member
of the defense team.This expert could be used by defense coun-
sel either to attack the results of the Commonwealth's tests or
to conduct independent tests for the defense.7 If defense coun-
sel requests the appointment of an expert by the court, counsel
should investigate potential experts and be prepared to request
that the court appoint a particular expert. Otherwise, the court
may appoint an expert who may favor the prosecution.
In order to either be given funds to hire a DNA expert or
have one appointed by the court, defense counsel must
demonstrate to the trial court that "the subject which neces-
sitates the assistance of the expert is 'likely to be a significant
factor in [the] defense'... and that [the defense] will be prej-
udiced by the lack of expert assistance:8OAdditionaly, defense
counsel must show a "particularized need" for the appoint-
ment of an expert."' The "particularized showing" requires
more than a "[mlere hope or suspicion that favorable evi-
dence"will be produced by the expert.82The determination of
whether such a"particularized showing" has been made is "a
flexible one and must be determined on a case-by-case basis"
and lies within the "discretion of the trial judge."3
Summary and analysis by
Brian S. Clarke
75Satche, 126 E3d at 570.
7 6 d. (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,327 (1995)).
7Id.
78Id. at 571.
"See Ake v. Oklahoma 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (holding that when a
defendant's mental condition is a significant factor in a criminal pro-
ceeding, the defendant is entitled to the appointment of a psycholog-
ical expert to assist in the defense) &Husske v. Commonwealth, 252
Va. 203,211,476 S.E.2d 920,925 (1996) (extending Ake rationale to
non-psychiatric experts, including DNA experts, inVruginia).
"Husske, 252 Va. at 212,476 S.E.2d at 925 (quoting Ake, 470
U.S. at 82-83).
8'Ia at 212,476 S.E.2d at 926.The "particularized showing"requires
more than a" [m]ere hope or suspicion that favorable evidence" will be
produced by the expert.Id (quoting State v.Mills, 420 S.E.2d 114,117
(N.C. 1992)). The determination of whether such a "particularized
showing" has been made is"a flexible one and must be determined on
a case-by-case basis"and lies within the"discretion of the trial judge."Id
'Id. (quoting State v. Mills, 420 S.E.2d 114,117 (N.C. 1992)).
131d. (quoting State v. Mills, 420 S.E.2d 114,117 (N.C. 1992)).
